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Can Intertemporal Choice Experiments Elicit Time
Preferences for Consumption? Yes
by
Glenn W. Harrison and J. Todd Swarthout †

May 2011
ABSTRACT.
The most popular experimental method for eliciting time preferences involves subjects making
choices over smaller, sooner amounts of money and larger, later amounts of money. Under some
theoretically possible configurations of preferences and procedures, the discount rates inferred from
these choices could lead to misleading inferences about time preferences for consumption. Using a
direct empirical test, we show that those configurations of preferences are empirically implausible.
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A long series of intertemporal choice experiments have asked subjects to make decisions
over time-dated amounts of money. From these observed choices inferences about discount rates
have been drawn. Strictly speaking, these are discount rates over stocks of money. So the inferences
are about money discount rates: see Frederick, Lowenstein and Prelec [2002] for a review, and Coller
and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] for detailed examples. To economists, it
is more natural to think of discount rates defined over utility, and then one has to attend to the
possibility of diminishing marginal utility in order to make correct inferences about utility discount
rates: see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008]. But once one thinks of utility discount
rates, it becomes more natural, for many economists, to think in terms of the utility of consumption
flows, rather than stocks of money. In that case, Cubitt and Read [2007] correctly show that, even if
one assumes linear utility functions for simplicity of exposition, discount rates over money do not
necessarily elicit discount rates over consumption.
There are several immediate rhetorical responses to this conclusion, none of which are
convincing to all. After reviewing these, we propose a direct, constructive test of the question, and
then provide evidence.
The first rhetorical response is to note that economists tend to think of utility functions the
way geese think of their parents: they imprint on their first vision. If the first utility function you saw
had consumption as the argument, that is what you view as “the” utility function; if it had wealth,
money, or just a solitary x, then that is “the” utility function. The reality is that utility functions are
just a convenient mathematical receptacle for whatever we want them to be about, and one can find
serious economics done with any of these arguments. But this does not justify ignoring the
implications for consumption as an argument, it just puts those arguments in perspective as one of
several in which economists are interested.
-1-

The second rhetorical response is to recognize that one can make structural assumptions
about the link between time-dated money and consumption flows, and hence “translate” inferences
about the former into inferences about the latter. This is what Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2008] did, with a “dual-self” model of decision-making following Fudenberg and Levine
[2006]. But this approach does not test the proposition in question. Instead it makes assumptions,
whether or not they are a priori plausible, that are hard to easily test, and that allow one to infer
discount rates over consumption flows if true.
The third rhetorical response is to ask if the “worst case” preferences that generate
differences between money discount rates and consumption discount rates are plausible. As
illustrated below, this worst case requires that the elasticity of substitution between consumption
flows in two periods be sufficiently low. Assumptions about this elasticity allow one to bound the
possible difference between the two discount rates, and those bounds can become very tight for
plausible elasticities. But this type of argument cannot be complete: economists love theoretical
exceptions that cannot be directly ruled out a priori.
Our approach is to ask if this “worst case” behavior is indeed observed, when one modifies
the basic experimental design to allow it to show itself. A simple modification of the canonical
experimental task, channeling a constructive suggestion by Cubitt and Read [2007] themself, shows
that one “almost never” observes the preferences that generate the problems they pose. Of course,
this conclusion, while comforting, is only for the sample of subjects from one population. But it
shifts the burden of proof to those who would claim that intertemporal choice experiments defined
over time-dated money cannot elicit time preferences for consumption.
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1. Theory
We briefly restate the useful theoretical construction of Cubitt and Read [2007], to see the
problem and our resolution. Let the pre-task endowment be e1 in period 1 and e2 in period 2.
Option S offers the income stream (e1+s, e2) and option L offers the income stream (e1, e2+l ).
When will these income streams be the consumption streams? Call SC the consumption stream from
S, and LC the consumption stream from L.
Consider the interesting case in which the subject faces imperfect capital markets, and hence
faces the opportunity set in the lab marked by the bold lines in Figure 1, from Cubitt and Read
[2007; Figure 2]. In their notation, borrowing and lending rates, rb and rl respectively, bound the
lending rates available in the experimental lab, re. Points SC and LC can be immediately realized if
the subject picks S or L and consumes that income stream. But, critically, S and L also support the
consumption points in the line joining SC and E, and then E and LC, since the agent can
(imperfectly) convert period 1 income into period 2 consumption (hence the segment from SC to
E), and vice versa (hence the segment from LC to E).
Now simply add some carefully drawn, but legitimate, indifference curves, as in Figure 2,
from Cubitt and Read [2007; Figure 3], and one can see the potential inferential problem. This
picture shows a situation in which S provides greater utility than L, but the agent prefers LC to SC.
The agent prefers LC to SC if these were the only consumption streams available from these lab
choices over L and S. But the agent would really like to get to A, and that requires a choice of S (to
get to SC) and some use of the (imperfect) capital market.
Binary choices between S and L run into this issue. The point has logical validity for some
interesting cases and some popular conceptions of what utility is defined over, as noted earlier.
Inspection of Figure 2 shows how different assumptions about preferences could affect the severity
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of the issue. The “problem” arises if utility functions are sufficiently kinked. If the elasticity of
substitution between sooner and later consumption is low enough, there is a problem; but if it is
high enough there will be no problem, and individuals will jump directly from S to L without lusting
after some intermediate, mixed allocation like A. How can “low enough” and “high enough” be
tested?
Cubitt and Read [2007] propose some complicated income-indifference methods, which
have been popular in the Fill-In-the-Blank (FIB) literature, in order to judge how serious this
problem is.1 But if one offers subjects the choice of forming a portfolio in the lab between the sooner and later
options, then in effect one is allowing them to pick a consumption point in Figure 1 along the dotted
span connecting LC and SC. For each time-dated pair of monetary payments, the subject can decide
what fraction of each to receive. If the pair is $100 now or $150 in 1 year, and the subject picks the
fraction ¼, then this choice would entail the subject receiving $100 × ¼ = $25 now and $150 × ¾
= $112.50 in 1 year. Obviously, the binary choice method widely used in the discounting literature is
a special case when the subject picks a fraction of 0 or 1.
As noted, this portfolio approach allows the individual to pick a consumption point in
Figure 1 along the dotted span connecting LC and SC. This span dominates the span LC-E-SC. So if
someone declines the opportunity to be in the dotted span joining LC and SC when it is costlessly
offered, and clings to the LC or SC options, then this theoretical concern vanishes.
The portfolio method was actually proposed briefly, but clearly, by Cubitt and Read [2007;

1

We firmly reject the behavioral reliability of FIB methods, which have been widely and casually
adopted across the experimental spectrum. We appreciate that they are theoretically attractive in the sense of
providing more information if behaviorally reliable. It is always more informative to know the certainty
equivalent of a lottery instead of a binary choice, or the present value of a time-dated money stock instead of
a binary choice, if one can rely on those elicited values behaviorally. We reject that premise. The argument on this issue
is not germane here.
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p.384]. It was subsequently implemented by Andreoni and Sprenger [2010], with some other
extensions.2 Our interface, shown in Figure 3, follows the clean design of Andreoni and Sprenger
[2010].
One might argue that the portfolio method runs into problems because of “Fisherian
separation.” This is where the agent has access to perfect capital markets, so a choice of S or L
reveals nothing about what consumption tradeoffs are. But the portfolio method only gives the
agent access to a perfect capital market inside the lab, and only with respect to the allocation between
SC and LC. If the agent does not take advantage of the intermediate income stream made available
in the lab then they are presumed to face the imperfect capital market outside the lab.

2. Data
Sixty subjects were recruited to participate in experiments at Georgia State University in
March 2011. The general recruitment message did not mention the show-up fee or any specific
range of possible earnings, and subjects were recruited from large classes across campus.
Instructions for the discounting task are presented in an appendix. Every subject received a copy of
the instructions, printed in color, and the instructions were read out word-for-word by the same
experimenter. Every subject also completed a demographic survey covering standard characteristics,
as well as a survey of alcohol use and gambling behavior. All subjects were paid in cash at the end of

2

The formal procedure employed by Andreoni and Sprenger [2010] extended the method proposed
here by giving the subject 100 tokens to allocation between the sooner and later time period, and then varying
the exchange rate between tokens and money for sooner or later amounts. In our case the exchange rate is the
same for sooner and later amounts. The reason for their procedural extension is to avoid having to conduct a
separate experimental task to elicit the (instantaneous) utility function of the subject, as proposed by
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008]. For present purposes this correction for diminishing marginal
utility is not important.
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each session, as well as by check for any time-delayed payment choices.3 Every subject also
completed a salient task involving choices between lotteries, prior to the discounting task.
The discounting tasks used principals of $10, $30 and $60, and horizons of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
weeks. Each subject made 72 choices: for each principal and each horizon, they were offered 4
choices with nominal discount rates selected at random between 5% and 200%.4 There was no front
end delay on the sooner option, so the choice was between money now and money later, following
most of the discounting literature.
Figure 4 displays the data, which “speaks for itself.” The overwhelming majority of choices
were at the endpoints of 0 and 100% portfolio allocation. Table 1 shows the data, rounded to the
nearest 5 percentage points allocated to the later amount. The detailed data are just as clear: of the
4,320 total choices, 2,942 were at exactly 0% allocated to the later amount, 12 were at 1%, 9 were at
2%, 9 were at 3%, 6 were at 5%, 8 were at 95%, 1 was at 96% and 552 were at exactly 100%. So
81% of the choices were at the extremes. No statistical analysis of these data seems needed.

3. Conclusion
Yes, intertemporal choice experiments do elicit time preferences for consumption, at least
for the sampled population.

3

Subjects were told that any future payments would be sent to them by check, mailed two days prior
to the date identified in the task. They were also told that if they preferred to arrange to collect it on campus
they could do so. All dates for future payments were week-days and none were holidays.
4
For each principal-horizon combination, 4 nominal discount rates were randomly chosen with equal
probability from a set of 14 candidate rates consisting of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 75%,
100%, 125%, 150%, 175%, and 200%.
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Figure 1: The Budget Sets Resulting from S and L when re is Strictly Intermediate
(Figure 2 of Cubitt and Read [2007])
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Figure 2: Time Preferences Such That S is Chosen Over L Although LC is Preferred to SC
(Figure 3 of Cubitt and Read [2007])
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Figure 3: Our Portfolio Choice Interface
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Figure 4: Portfolio Allocations in Discounting Task
Raw data from N=60 subjects
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100

Table 1: Tabulation of Portfolio Choices
Observed allocations rounded to the nearest 5 percentage points

Percent Allocation to Later Amount

Frequency

Fraction

0

2,963

68.6%

5

15

0.3%

10

16

0.4%

15

13

0.3%

20

18

0.4%

25

51

1.2%

30

11

0.2%

35

28

0.7%

40

37

0.9%

45

34

0.8%

50

401

9.3%

55

7

0.2%

60

14

0.3%

65

10

0.2%

70

31

0.7%

75

47

1.1%

80

18

0.4%

85

19

0.4%

90

26

0.6%

95

9

0.2%

100

552

12.3%

All

4,320

100%
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Appendix: Instructions
Sooner versus Later Payments
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date. The sooner date will always be
today, while the later date will vary between 1 and 6 weeks from today. An example of decision
screen is shown below. You will make all decisions on a computer.

This screen shows four decisions. Each decision is presented on a different row. All
decisions have the same format. Let’s look at the first decision in the example above (the one on the
first decision row). The sooner payment is $50 today and the later payment is $52 in two weeks
from today. You choose an allocation of each payment by entering percentages in each box. You
can choose any allocation you want: for example, 100% now and 0% later, 75% now and 25% later,
33% now and 67% later, or 0% now and 100% later. As you type in percentages, the screen will
-13-

display the dollar amount associated with each percentage.
The percent allocation you indicate will be paid to you on the date indicated. Thus, if you
pick 50% of the $50 today you would receive $25 = 0.50 × $50 today, and you would receive $26 =
0.50 × $52 in 14 days. If needed, we will round to the nearest penny.
We will present you with 18 of these decision screens, with each screen having 4 allocations
for you to make. You must make all 4 allocations on the decision screen before moving to the next
decision screen. While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions is that the
dollar amounts of the future payment will change. However, different decision screens will have
different dollar amounts and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay attention to
both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions.
You will be paid for one of these decisions. We will select one of your 18 decision sheets by
rolling a 20-sied die until a number between 1 and 18 comes up, and then rolling a 4-sided die to
pick one decision on that screen. When you make your choices you will not know which decision is
selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for
payment.
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. If you receive some
money today, then it is paid out at the end of the experiment as cash. If you receive some money to
be paid in the future, then a check will be mailed to you two days before the specified date, and
dated for payment on the specified date. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will
receive a written confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be
paid to you on that date. If you prefer to pick the check up on the specified date we can make
arrangements for that instead of mailing it to you.
The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee and any
earnings from other tasks in this session.

-14-

